

Modelling a Backdraft Incident

The 62 Watts St (NY) Fire

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This paper was presented at 'Fire Safety by Design', Sunderland, 1995, and is published in the conference proceedings, compiled by G.W. Butler, Northern Branch. His permission to republish the article is gratefully acknowledged.

On March 28, 1994, the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) responded to a report of smoke and sparks issuing from a chimney at a three story apartment building in Manhattan. The officer-in-charge ordered three person hose teams to make entry into the first and second floor apartments while the truck company ventilated the stairway from the roof. When the door to the first floor apartment was forced open, a large flame issued from the apartment and up the stairway, engulfing the three firefighters at the second floor landing. The flame persisted for at least 6½ minutes, resulting in their deaths. The FDNY requested the assistance of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to model the incident in the hope of understanding the factors which produced a backdraft condition of such a duration. The CFAST model was able to reproduce the observed conditions and supported a theory of the accumulation of significant quantities of unburned fuel from a vitiated fire in an apartment which had been insulated and sealed for energy efficiency.

1. The Building

The fire occurred in a three story, multiple brick dwelling of ordinary construction approximately 6.1 m (20 ft.) wide by 14 m (46 ft.) deep, and 3½ stories tall. The building contained four apartments, one on each storey, with the basement apartment half below grade. While the basement apartment had its own entrance, access to the others was by an enclosed stairway running up the side of the building. The building was attached to an identical building (64 Watts St.) which was not involved.

The buildings were built in the late 1800s and had undergone many alterations over the years. Recent renovations included replacement of the plaster/lathe with drywall on wood studs, lowering the ceilings to 2.5m (8.25 ft.), new windows and doors, heavy thermal insulation, sealing and caulking to minimize air infiltration (the building was described as very tight). Built before central heating, the apartments had numerous fireplaces, most of which had been sealed. The apartment of fire origin had two fireplaces, but only the one in the living room was operable. All apartments had thick plank wood floors.




Figure 1. 62 Watts St.

The apartments had similar floorplans; the differences resulting from the stairway. A floorplan of the first floor apartment is presented in Figure 2. There was a living room in the front, kitchen and bathroom in the center, and a bedroom in the rear. The first floor apartment had an office within the bedroom which was not found in the other apartments, but which was not significant in the fire. The roof had a scuttle for access and a wired glass skylight located over the stairway.

2. The Incident

On March 28, 1994 at 7:36pm, the New York City Fire Department received a telephone report of heavy smoke and sparks coming from a chimney at 62 Watts St., Manhattan. The initial response was 3 engines, 2 ladders, and a battalion chief. On arrival they saw the smoke from the chimney but no other signs of fire.

The engine companies were assigned to ventilate the roof above the stairs by opening the scuttle and skylight, and two, three-person hose teams advanced lines through the main entrance to the first and second floor apartment doors.

The first floor hose team forced the apartment door and reported:

- a momentary rush of air into the apartment, followed by
- a warm (but not hot) exhaust, followed by
- a large flame issuing from the upper part of the door and extending up the stairway.

The first floor team was able to duck down under the flame and retreat down the stairs, but the three men at the second floor level were engulfed by the flame which now filled the stairway. An amateur video was being taken from across the street and became an important source of information when later reviewed by the fire department. This showed the flame filling the stairway and venting out the open scuttle and skylight, extending well above the roof of the building. Further, the video showed that the flame persisted at least 6 minutes (the tape had several pauses of unknown duration, but there was 6½ minutes of tape showing the flame).

Damage to the apartment of origin was limited to the living room, kitchen and hall – closed doors prevented fire spread to the bedroom, bath, office, and closets. There was no fire extension to the other apartments and no structural damage. The wired glass in the skylight was melted in long “icicles” and the wooden stairs were mostly consumed. The description provided by the surviving hose team was of a classic backdraft; but these usually persist only seconds before exhausting their fuel supply. Where did the fuel come from to feed this flame for so long?

3. Cause and Origin

The subsequent investigation revealed that the first floor occupant went out at 6:25pm, leaving a plastic trash bag atop the (gas) kitchen range; which he was sure was turned




Figure 2. First floor apartment.

off. It is reasonable that the pilot light ignited the bag, which then involved several bottles of high alcohol content liquor on the counter, and spread the fire to the wood floor and other contents. The occupant confirmed that all doors and windows were closed, so that the only source of combustion air was the fireplace flue in the living room from which the smoke and sparks were seen to emerge.

4. Theory

Clearly, the fire burned for nearly an hour under severely vitiated conditions. The open flue initially provided expansion relief and later vented smoke as the ceiling layer dropped below the level of the opening. Such vitiated combustion results in the production of large quantities of unburned fuel and high CO/CO₂ ratios. As shown in studies of the backdraft phenomenon [1], when a door is opened under such conditions, warm air flowing out is replaced by ambient air which carries oxygen to the fuel. When this combustible mixture ignites, a large flame extends from the door. To determine whether enough fuel could collect within the apartment to feed the flame for the period of time observed, the CFAST model [2] was used to recreate the incident.

5. Computer Analysis

The apartment of origin was modeled as a single room with dimensions of 6.1m (20 ft.) by 14m (46 ft.) by 2.5m (8.25 ft.). The stairway was modeled as a second room 1.2m (4 ft.) by 3m (10 ft.) by 9.1m (30 ft.) connected to the apartment by a closed door and having a roof vent of 0.84 m² (9 ft²) area. The fireplace flue was modeled as a 10m (33 ft.) high vertical duct with a cross section of 0.14 m² (1.5 ft²). All these dimensions were provided by the fire department from measurements taken at the scene.

The initial fire was assumed to be a constant heat release rate (HRR) of 25 kW from actual data on burning trash bags [3]. This fire then transitioned into a “medium t²” fire with a peak heat release rate of 1MW (Figure 3);




Figure 3. HRR in apartment.

however this was never reached due to limited oxygen. Such “medium t²” fires are characteristic of most common items of residential contents [4].

6. Results

Compiling and entering the data into CFAST required approximately two hours and the model required only a few seconds to perform the calculations. The fire grew to




Figure 4. Oxygen concentrations.

about 500 kW over 5 minutes of simulation time, then rapidly throttled back as the oxygen concentration dropped below 10% (Figure 4). Temperatures in the apartment peaked briefly at about 300°C (570°F) at the time of peak burning, then rapidly dropped below 100°C (200°F) as the burning rate fell (Figure 5). The concentration of carbon monoxide (CO) rose to about 3000 ppm and unburned fuel accumulated within the apartment volume during this stage of vitiated combustion.

The front door was opened at 2250 seconds into the simulation as an estimate of when the first floor team made entry. Immediately, there was an outflow of warm (100°C) air from the upper part of the doorway, followed by an inrush of ambient air in the lower part of the doorway, followed by the emergence of a large door flame — exactly as reported by the firefighters. This door flame grew within a few seconds to a peak burning rate of nearly 5 MW (Figure 6), raising the temperature in the stairway to over 1200°C (2200°F) (Figure 5) sufficient to melt the glass in the skylight, as observed. Most importantly, the quantity of unburned fuel accumulated in the apartment caused the door flame to persist for more than 7 minutes (Figure 6).




Figure 6 Upper temperatures.




Figure 5. Upper temperatures.

7. Discussion

The CFAST calculations showed that the theory of the development of this fire was technically sound. They supported the hypothesis that unburned fuel and CO accumulated in an apartment with an open fireplace flue but otherwise tightly sealed, resulting in a backdraft on opening of the apartment door. They showed that sufficient fuel could accumulate under these underventilated conditions to cause the door flame to persist for the extended period observed. Reported conditions such as smoke flowing out the fireplace chimney, flows observed in the doorway, melting of the glass skylight, and fire damage in the apartment and stairway, all were reproduced by the model.

Some assumptions were necessary in performing these calculations which may have an impact on the model's predictions. The results are sensitive to the volume of the apartment and to the size and locations of ventilation openings. All of these were accurately known by actual measurements taken by the fire department during their investigation. It was reported that the apartment was very tightly sealed, so the assumption of no additional leakage was justified. Ventilation provided by the fireplace flue was based on actual dimensions.

The combustion was predominately ventilation controlled, making the results insensitive to fuel loading and the specific burning characteristics of the fuel. The generation rate of unburned fuel should be affected by energy feedback from the environment and any flames present during the time of ventilation controlled combustion. The CFAST model does not contain such a self-consistent combustion model, so these effects were not included, and the quantity of unburned fuel could be overpredicted by an unknown amount. Such overprediction would tend to increase the duration of the door flame (but not its peak value). Since the duration of the flame matched that observed, either the effect is small or there were compensating errors in the estimate of the extent of fire involvement. The fire was in steady-state for a significant period prior to the time assumed for opening the door, so the predicted results are insensitive to that time. The backdraft condition occurred spontaneously in the model when the door was opened.

8. Lessons Learned

In follow-up discussions with members of the New York City Fire Department, they concluded that, while the fire service has long recognized the dangers of backdraft, the unusually long duration of the flame under these conditions represents a hazard against which their protective equipment is ineffective. As buildings become better insulated and sealed for energy efficiency, such hazards to firefighters may become increasingly common. Thus, new operational procedures need to be developed to reduce the likelihood of exposure to flames of this duration.

The fire department also reported that, as a result of the publicity surrounding this incident, a small number of similar incidents were reported to the fire department's safety division which had occurred before this one, but which had gone unreported because no one had been injured. This fact reinforces the need for improved

operational procedures. The success of this exercise also pointed out the benefits of the use of modern, computer fire modeling in the reconstruction of fire incidents to understand critical factors for mitigating their impacts.

9. References

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3. Babrauskas, V., Burning Rates, Section 2, Chapter 1 in the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 1st edition, P. DiNenno ed., SFPE, Boston, MA, USA, 1988.
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At 6.10, the first appliance arrived to be confronted with a heavily smoke-logged property from which were issuing large volumes of smoke. The crew was informed by bystanders that a child was trapped upstairs; Firefighters Lane and Griffin were ready to enter, wearing breathing apparatus sets which they had donned during the journey. Shortly before 6.12, the crew entered the front of the building with a hosereel and climbed the stairs. Two minutes later the BA team emerged carrying a child casualty.

Resuscitation began immediately and, at 6.15, a message was sent to Brigade Control to make sure that an ambulance was on its way. It was observed that conditions within the property remained unchanged – still heavily smoke-logged with no flaming visible.

Members of the public shouted that there were still persons inside. Firefighters Lane and Griffin again entered and climbed the stairs for further search and rescue.

A few seconds later, Brigade personnel heard a "Whoosh" sound and felt a movement of air coming from the building. One crew member reported the entire building becoming engulfed in a fireball; another witnessed the inner, wired glass door being slammed shut on the hosereel tubing – with the BA team trapped inside.

Despite repeated attempts, the heat was too intense to effect rescue until some 11 minutes later when the crews of both appliances were able to reduce the temperature sufficiently to enter.

Later investigation established that the fire had started in a pile of clothes in the carpeted kitchen at the rear of the property. At 5.48, the occupier had woken up to a smoke-logged house, had discovered the fire and then closed the door between kitchen and lounge before leaving the property. The front door was left open.

A neighbour later reported that, at about 6.05, the UPVC kitchen window failed and there was a sudden increase in the ferocity of the fire with flames exiting the rear kitchen window. It is estimated that the kitchen ceiling must have reached a temperature of ~1,000°C, raising the temperature of the carpeted bedroom floor immediately above and releasing flammable vapours into the already smoke-logged room. It is believed that, at about 6.15, the kitchen fire broke through into the bedroom resulting in a sudden deflagration moving through the property from the first floor to ground floor – a delayed backdraft.

HSE's letter to the South Wales Authority opened as follows:

HSE's investigation into the death of firefighters Lane and Griffin at Blaina, Gwent was undertaken in the full realisation that firefighters will enter situations of considerable personal risk if they believe there is a chance of saving others. By the very nature of fire service work, great reliance must be placed on the judgements of those on the fireground, based on their training and experience. In view of the high level of risk inherent in the job, the health and safety aspects of firefighter training must be afforded high priority.

Our broad investigation focused not upon the specific actions of the Blaina or Abertillery crews and others involved in the incident, but on the whole framework of information, support and training, within Gwent Fire Brigade and nationally, which aims to equip firefighters to make realistic assessments as to the appropriate actions to take on the fireground.

HSE's enquiries centred on the training of firefighters to recognise the situations they are faced with on the fireground, particularly in this case with regard to flashover and backdraught situations, and to use appropriate firefighting techniques which minimise the risk to themselves and their colleagues.

and concluded:

1. *Health and safety arrangements were not adequate, in that those senior officers with specific health and safety duties had little health and safety training themselves and did not have access to expertise within the Brigade. Health and safety was not managed as a priority issue.*
2. *The training provided did not adequately equip firefighters to recognise and deal with the situation encountered at Blaina.*
3. *Monitoring of watch based training was not sufficiently rigorous to spot areas which had not been covered adequately. Resources for officers delivering training were not sufficient to ensure quality training (e.g. comprehensive bibliographies, lecture packs, overhead slides).*
4. *Few firefighters in Gwent had received useful hot fire training.*

The measures to be taken to discharge the Improvement Notice within six months of issue are aimed at establishing, for the new South Wales Fire Service, sound training programmes for firefighters, supported by adequate facilities and resources. Current best practice in the three constituent Brigades is to be critically assessed to establish what further improvements may be required to produce a coherent programme of training which will equip firefighters, so far as reasonably practicable, to deal appropriately with conditions on the fireground.

In the light of this background, the Education and Technical Committee is to be recommended for its foresight in recommending that papers on backdraught and flashover be published in the Journal.